

The Military and Society in Turkey: Prospects for Change and Lessons for Pakistan

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Abstract

The democratic setup in any country requires the supremacy of elected and representative state institutions in the affair of governance. However, military as a non-representative state institution cannot be excluded from certain areas of decision making largely pertaining to the defense, where they have reasonable assertions of expertise. Although in democratic states, range and discourse of military remains subject to the civilian oversight, national narratives primarily advocate guardian approach of military in transitional societies like Turkey and Pakistan. The level of trust among these societies towards their armed forces instead of political class makes military substantially persuasive in politics. The Turkish and Pakistani case studies manifest that in political systems where society has a strong bond with its armed forces, military interventions are less likely to face resistance. The responses of Turkish society to the military coup of 2016 provided that societal support is one of the key determinants of manifestation of civil-military relations. The changed pattern of Turkish society in favor of its political class gradually consolidated democracy while compelling Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) to accept this paradigm shift. This also provides similar parameters with few exceptions to analyze the role of Pakistani society for glorifying the status of army by endorsing national narratives and prospects of continuity or change of civil-military relations. This research assumes that change into societal approach towards military in Pakistan can also lead towards consolidation of democracy. The balanced civil-military relations can be built in transitional societies with the help of the dynamic support of society towards representative institutions and political class.

Keywords: Turkey, Pakistan, Civil-military Relations, Society, Democracy, Intervention.

Introduction

The colonization trends across the globe gradually declined in early twentieth century but in many states, colonial legacies paved grounds for authoritarian rule. Moreover, ethnic, linguistic, socio-economic and religious divides made some societies more bifurcated. In such states, to facilitate the process of national integration and conservation of the national interests, authoritarian approaches had been incorporated which enhanced the role of armed forces in politics. Turkey and Pakistan have been endured varying

intensity of democratic transformations throughout the years. The democratic alterations in both countries, especially in Turkey provided prospects for structural changes and enhanced the role of societies to limit the military encroachment into politics. The objective of underlying study is to raise some fundamental questions regarding nature of civil- military imbalances in association with the role and responses of societies in Turkey and Pakistan. This research expounds that despite strong constitutional footings of Turkish military and precedents of military interventions throughout the history of the Turkish Republic, military coup in 2016 largely failed due to vigorous responses from Turkish society in support of civilian government. This also provides a framework to understand the prospects of change or continuity of civil-military relations within the societal context in Pakistan. This paper is an attempt to understand the varying intensity of societal support and societal restraint to the institution of military in Turkey and Pakistan. This study also attempts to address following research questions;

- How did the national narratives and constitutional uncertainties shape the role of armed forces of Turkey and Pakistan into the political arena?
- Is society one of the key factors for enduring the superiority of institution of military over the political class?
- How were the societies in Turkey and Pakistan transformed through military endorsed ideologies?
- What is the extent of societal backed constitutional reforms required to demilitarize the politics?
- How the democratic changes along with society's support to the political class and an altered approach towards civil-military relations in Turkey provided prospects for democratic consolidation and some lessons for Pakistan?

Theoretical Conception of Role of Military in Politics

As a result of 'waves of democratization' and its relevance with civil-military relations in the decades of the 1950s and 1960s, most of the research on the role of military in politics became focused towards its relationship with nature of societies and functions of polity. The role of political institutions, norms of a political system, and practices of a given society at large manifest the nature of civil-military relations in a state. Feaver (1996) expounds that civilians are supposed to be the political decision makers as they can evaluate the acceptable risk for the society while military can only quantify the risks. He pronounces that polity has to balance the two key concerns of civil-military relations in a given society. It includes creation of a strong enough military establishment for the sake of the prime cause of defending the state, though this should be ensured that military establishment does not acquire the ability to turn on the state

for which it got created (p. 154). Owens (2017) while extending Feaver's Civil-military 'Problematique' conception asserts that the response of a given polity can be analyzed as a bargain settled among the three parties; civilian government, citizens of the state and institution of military. The prime purpose is to allocate responsibilities and sanctions. Whereas, the citizenry may not be directly involved into creating a balance between political leadership and the uniformed military, though respective bargain cannot sustain without the support of citizens. Unlike liberal democracies, in authoritarian states, generally role of the citizenry is abridged and sometimes military has a state (pp. 3-4). Huntington (1957) argues that in western democracies, professionalism is the key to the military autonomy and maintaining 'Objective Civilian Control'¹ over the institution of the military, which leads to manage the coercive power of the military while making sure that those who govern do not become tyranny to the governed (pp. 83-4). Finer (1962) explicates that military intervention is largely a result of minimal political culture of a given society. It is the vital factor to augment the vulnerability of a regime to the military intervention. Huntington (1968) explains the most significant reason of military intervention while pronouncing that "the same causes which produce military intervention in politics...lie not in the nature of the group but in the structure of society. In particular, they lie in the absence or weakness of effective political institutions in the society". He further clarifies that in underdeveloped societies, military interventions are primarily the manifestations of a wider phenomenon related to the politicization of institutions and social forces of the state (pp. 194-6). Janowitz (1977) explicates that civilian control can be defined in the terms of societal control rather than pronouncing it as institutional or state control. He is of the view that it's not only military professional standards which makes military officers subject to the civilian control, but a meaningful "integration with civilian values" (p.420). Burke (2002) while referring to stable democracies, points out that balanced civil-military relations can promote democratic values while ensuring the authority of elected representatives of state on military (p.2). Cottey (2002) asserts that the democratic control of military is a distorted conception. The prime issue is the threat of a praetorian army which can be addressed through executive civilian control. However, he suggests that democratic control can be re-conceptualized by shifting the prime focus on establishing effective structures for democratic governance rather than considering at first place reforming the state institutions for the political control of the military.

How did the national narratives and constitutional uncertainties shape the role of armed forces of Turkey and Pakistan into the political arena?

The institution of the military has always enjoyed a special standing in Turkish Republic and Pakistani federation, however, their roles to establish their respective states, reconciliation with religion and support to democracy are quite different. The guardianship approach of Turkish military is primarily grounded in

its particular historical settings. The legacy of military involvement in Turkish politics goes back to the Ottoman time where military played a key role to extend the territory of the Ottoman Empire during the course of centuries. The gradual decline of Ottoman Empire progressed a War of Independence from 1919-1923 where men in uniform won the War and significantly contributed to set up the foundation of Turkish Republic. The modernization process in Turkey was primarily driven by the military concerns and led to favor the establishment of state institutions on the western model.ⁱⁱ This gave birth to a generation of reformist military men as these officers began to see themselves as vanguard of enlightenment approach. Under the leadership of the founding father; Mustafa Kemal Pasha Ataturk and his ideology known as Kemalismⁱⁱⁱ, Turkey experienced a top down modernization which promoted secular nationalism largely based on an assimilation approach. After independence, legacy of TAF to act as guardian of secular Turkey while supervising reforms and proclamation of democratic aspirations continued and was followed by his successor Inonu (Momayezi, 1998, p. 3). Since 1930's, TAF acted as the guarantor of territorial integrity, political stability, ideological legacy of Ataturk and the mystic embodiment of the nation (Jenkins, 2007, p. 354). The officer corps was viewed as the carrier of the progressive reforms of Kemalism and protector of Turkish society. This also affected the process of recruitment of the Turkish military to continue the Kemalist commitments through conscription of sons of military men and bureaucratic officers into TAF. Furthermore, the idea of a military nation was dynamically initiated and inculcated in Turkish society to transform it into an army nation through education system in initial years of 1930s as it was reinforced in 1927 by compulsory military service.^{iv} The public prestige of institution of the military was enlarged by guided transition of the Turkish polity from a single party regime to the multi-party system in 1950 (Jenkins, 2007, pp. 340-41).

Pakistan as a newly independent state in 1947 was characterized by colonial imbalances between society and post-colonial state where later developed more than the former which made it an 'over-developed' state as military emerged central to the interests of the leading ruling classes (Alvi, 1972, pp. 67-9). The dominance of armed forces in politics is a colonial baggage in Pakistan as military was in essence trained by the British Empire to sustain its control over the colonial territory of Sub-continent.^v The Pakistani military as the successor of British army inherited 'apolitical professionalism' with a strict hierarchy, but also absorbed the colonial mindset of viewing nationalist political class as agitators and treacherous. Additionally, as a part of colonial legacy, they were more inclined to centralize state structures like vice regal system to ensure social order and internal security. The swift institutional evolution of military was supported by the milieu where Pakistani polity was largely divided and external threats were evident to the very existence of Pakistani state.^{vi} The state elite primarily assumed that centralization of authority of state was the key to the desired nation building process as well as it would facilitate uniform economic and political modernization of society (Shah, 2014, p.5-6).The military gradually acquired its control over

the apparatus of state with each military intervention. The professional competency in comparison with the political incompetence of the political class remained one of the justifications for episodic military interventions in Pakistan. Secondly, the irrefutable patriotism of the Pakistan army and its claims of commitment to the people were largely acknowledged by Pakistani society as they remained less resilient to military coups. Additionally, military officers assume that they comprehend the national interests of the state better than civilian institutions. The alleged corruption of the Pakistani politicians while portraying military as most trustworthy state institution with an acceptable level of competency served as a justification of each military coup in Pakistan (Cohen, 2004, p. 127-8).

The Turkish and Pakistani militaries perceive themselves as the ultimate guardian of their respective state. TAF viewed itself as a symbol of unity and instrument of nationhood largely against the disruptive forces of religion, sectarianism and separatist tendencies of Kurdish nationalism. Whereas Pakistani military's assertions of guardian approach stems from the national security state paradigm which certainly needed a powerful position in state apparatus primarily requiring subordination of all other stakeholders of state to the army's direction of national interests (Jahangir and Falki, 2016, p. 61). Some of the foreign policy compulsions especially the ever-looming threat of what is the extent of societal backed constitutional reforms required to demilitarize the politics? India's concerns about politically unstable Afghanistan, transnational ethnic connections beyond Pakistan's borders and growing interests of key powers in South Asian region authenticated the national security state thesis of armed forces and made it generally acceptable to the significant segment of the Pakistani society. Furthermore, fear of potential disintegration of Pakistani state stemming from its insecure borders gradually led to portray ethnic identities and elements of regional nationalism as the conflict-ridden forces.

Is society one of the key factors for evolving the superiority of institution of military over the political class?

In the context of support to their militaries, Turkish and Pakistani societies seem quite different. The Turkish society generally endorsed the political role of TAF and its favorable image as the founder of Turkish Republic. The Turkish society exhibited their confidence over the military while considering it as the most prestigious state institution prior to 2016. This was largely the result of the fear of potential decline of Turkish state which cultivated the feeling in the society that in any crisis, TAF would intervene to save the country. This clearly manifests that an ultimate guardianship role of TAF was directly an outcome of legitimacy provided by the Turkish society. The influence of military in Turkish society is largely the result of "An Army-in-Society" approach which makes it elite making institution rather than an army of elite (Ozbudan, 2000, p. 110). This societal support to TAF provided considerable leverage to military for directing the constitutional development in Turkey. The process of the constitution making in

Turkey has never been result of negotiations and bargains of political and social forces as it remained largely under the influence of military elite till the decade of 1980s. Neither the Ottoman constitution in 1876 nor the Republican constitutional frameworks of 1924, 1961 and 1982 were written or drafted by the Constituent Assembly or any other legislative body representing the Turkish Society. It has been observed that “the success and failure of military in controlling the transition process has a momentous consequence on its ability to persuade the events immediately thereafter.” (Momayezi, 1998, p. 10). Turkish military always secured the wide-ranging institutional safeguards before returning to the barracks. The acceptable transitions to the military were accomplished by conclusion of political pacts between TAF and political class. The military’s effort to establish political balance was primarily through crafting of the constitutions to dictate the transition process while excluding the old political class.

Unlike TAF, Pakistani military did not enjoy unconditional support of society. Military as a profession in Pakistan remained a symbol of certain social status, honor and privilege. However each military intervention though not resisted initially but faced opposition at later stages. This steadily led to clear distinguishment of the classes of civilian from service men especially the high rank officers. This differentiation was asserted by military men by generally calling non-military population as ‘bloody civilians’ for not being disciplined or lacking the skills which service men possess. The military coups in Pakistan are primarily the outcomes of conventional response of military to protect its institutional security and economic interests. This process helped military to evolve as an independent class in Pakistan which overshadowed other classes. The civilianization of General- Zia's regime in 1985 enabled Pakistani military to shift its emphasis from overt rule to a more subtle, but a ubiquitous role. This military led transition to civilian setup began when General Zia introduced far-reaching changes in the Constitution of 1973 while emphasizing on an all-powerful President (Zia himself) through referendum and a weak elected Prime Minister. The military regimes in Pakistan (except General Yahya Khan 1969-1971) brought their own set of principles either by introducing a new constitution (Constitution of 1962 under General Ayub Khan 1958-1969) or incorporating legal alterations into the existing Constitution of 1973 in the form of Article 58(2) (b) of the 8th amendment under General. Zia (1977-1988) and seventeenth amendment under General Musharraf (1999-2008).

In both Turkey and Pakistan, role of military in politics was consolidated through establishment of the National Security Council (NSC). The establishment of NSC in Turkey and Pakistan was the result of ‘Parent-Guardian Type’ approach. However, this type needs civilian partners to endorse the political role of respective armies. Such kind of legal alterations are generally incorporated through simple approval of the respective Parliament, which make military an equal partner in national resource and political power sharing rather than merely an instrument of policy. NSC enhanced the economic and political stakes of military officers in both states. The NSC in Turkey^{vii} largely known as MGK was established with an aim

of catering military opinion on the matter of national security. The Constitution of 1982 validated the 'Ultimate Guardian Approach' by incorporating the strong presidency and MGK as the highest non-elected decision-making body of the Turkish state. The MGK numerically tilted towards military elite as the ratio of representation was six officers and five political elite.

In Pakistan, primarily taking inspiration from Turkish model, the role of military was also institutionalized in 2004 under General Musharraf regime through an Act. However, the original idea of such council was initiated by the previous military regime of General. Zia. The NSC was established as a consultative body headed by President (who was in uniform then), including the Chiefs of army, air force, navy and chairman of JSCS (Joint Chief of Staff Committee), prime minister, Speaker of National Assembly, chairman Senate and four Chief Ministers of federating units. In comparison with TAF, Pakistani military as an institution did not get constitutional role to intervene in politics. The Article 245 of the Constitution of 1973 provides only limited role to military to secure the frontiers against the external aggression or assisting civilian government on its request in the time of emergency or national catastrophe. The previous Constitution of 1956 and even the Constitution of 1962 under a military president laid down the similar role for the Pakistani armed forces. The amendments incorporated into the Constitution of 1973 under military regimes in Pakistan were aimed to extend the rule of military General in power or to facilitate the military elite by appointing them as Head of civilian institutions and organizations. However, these legal alterations were discarded once the military dictator was forced to quit from power on political and societal pressure. Moreover, in NSC, there was lesser military representation (four military officers and nine civilian leaders) in comparison with Turkish MGK however scale of military influence in politics of Pakistan seemed extensive. In Pakistan, military backed patronage to certain civilians and religious groups is one of the significant reasons for advancing the institutional role of armed forces in politics. This helps Pakistani military to replace the existing political class, especially those who do not extend their cooperation to the military regime and also to facilitate those political and religious groups to come in power who otherwise are not capable to politically survive through electoral competition.

How were societies in Turkey and Pakistan transformed through military endorsed ideologies?

The relationship of military with society in both cases of Turkey and Pakistan can be explained as 'Parent-guardian type' where the military has a hegemonic relationship with respective societies, especially in post-1977 period in Pakistan and post-1961 period in Turkey.^{viii} This hegemonic relationship refers to complete but subtle control of politics, economy and society. Both militaries developed their all-encompassing control of society and state through legal, constitutional and political measures (Siddiq, 2007, p.45). Even though there are vast differences of consequences on respective societies in both countries.

The TAF inherited an imperial legacy, however transformed itself towards an army of a nationalist country, largely acknowledged by its society as a modernization force in support of democracy. Additionally the strength and nature of civilian control in a state is largely determined by the degree of external and internal threats, whereas in Turkish case, comparatively low external threats and high internal threats^{ix} provided military more opportunities to focus on politics of the country (Akca & Baltapaker, 2013, p. 78). Due to the perceived internal threats, throughout the years, TAF got support from political parties, media and significant sectors of society. In Turkey, military has long term goals which made it not only concerned with the domestic politics but also interested into the societal reformation in wake of implementing Kemalism. The TAF seemed more determine to tackle threats from different forces of society on the basis of their political apprehensions. The role of military in Turkish politics is significantly related to the attempts of converting Turkish Republic into a European state where adoption of western education, culture, social policy and way of life was viewed as an inevitable task by Ataturk. The proponents and followers of Kemalism perceived religion as a key obstruction to their grand design of reforms. The TAF remained exceedingly conscious about its role as an ideological task force prescribed by the Kemalism. Whenever military Generals and groups of officers felt insecurity from the political class for a potential threat of deviation from the principles of Kemalism, they intervened into the politics as these were the cases of 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997. This has been observed that each military intervention in Turkey till 2016 is characterized by unique features not only in the terms of underlying causes, but also in the context of the support provided by the society to the military involvement in politics. It has been also noted that despite the Turkish society's support to military involvement in politics, it always demanded better economy, consolidated democracy, progressive changes and measures to integrate with West.

Furthermore, contrasting to Turkish case, reforming the Pakistani society was not one of the key tasks for Pakistani military as it largely remained focus on its economic stakes while enhancing the political control as a means. Although efforts to institutionalize the military control over the state led to affect Pakistani society rigorously in 1977 and onwards. The radical changes were resultant in Pakistani society, especially during the Islamization process under General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) which was primarily launched to secure legitimacy for the military regime. The state structures and discourses under military regimes in Pakistan became more centralized which for the most part discarded the federal notion of Pakistani state especially at operational level. Furthermore, Pakistani society is heterogenic in the terms of ethnic composition though political leadership in early years and military elite later attempted to create state sponsored national homogenization largely characterized on single identity based on Islam. These endeavors politicized the linguistic and ethnic cleavages as no serious efforts had been made to resolve the issues of political representation and resources distribution in the course of power sharing solutions

through constitutional means. The lack of acknowledgement of its ethnic and linguistic diversity by the state elite faded the plural tones of Pakistani society while gradually transforming it into a bifurcated one. In a fragmented society like Pakistan with weak political parties primarily lacking national agendas to consolidate democracy, there were less chances of mass mobilization against any undemocratic setup or military intervention. The Pakistani society largely remained less resilient to the military coups as there was shortage of a larger consensus over the type of polity and democratic means as the only feasible solution to the governance issues. The authoritarian modes of political system especially under long interlude of military rules turned Pakistani society into an extremely divided entity. These divisions are characterized by political-federal disagreements, socio-economic disparities, ethnic antagonism, urban-rural divides, gender discriminations, sectarian categorization and ideological splits. In the wake of increase of social media usage by Pakistani middle class youth, tendency of tolerance, constructive debate and idea of co-existence of different segments of Pakistani society have been significantly declined. The ISPR^x (Inter Services Public Relations) twitter accounts and their social media campaigns on other forums to portray Pakistani military as the only trustworthy state institution is provoking further divides as supporters and critics of Pakistani military both draw on extreme approaches while labeling each other's traitors and anti-state.

How military's approach towards society and political process seems different in Turkey and Pakistan?

The TAF despite their reservations regarding civilian control have limited praetorian tendency which make them less interested into extended or long-term military rules. TAF throughout the years avoided taking partisan stands and remained largely free to alter its civilian allies and willingly returned to the barracks shortly after the each intervention. However, TAF largely stayed conscious about the potential threat of jeopardizing of secular nature of Turkey by democratic civilian government (Demirel, 2004, pp. 127-8).

The role of military in politics of Pakistan is explained by well-known author Stephen P. Cohen as 'Five Step Dance'. First military warns the political class which it largely considers as incompetent. Secondly a crisis paves grounds for military intervention followed by the third phase where key constitutional alterations are often introduced to correct the alleged mess created by the political class. In forth phase, gradually civilian restlessness becomes visible, which brings back the civilians in power partially as military regime attempts to civilianize its rule. Finally, military reasserts its powers behind a façade of an elected civilian government and this cycle repeats after some interval (Cohen, 2004, p.124). Cohen's analysis is authenticated by the fact that until 2013, no democratic transfer of power from one elected government to another was accomplished in Pakistan. The succeeding civilian governments in post-military regime period largely remained weak and transitory.

For Pakistani military, national security is apparently paramount to the sustainability of political process, democratic participation and representative state institutions. As a 'third party at number of occasions, top army commanders in Pakistan had used their influence to moderate a conflict among the politicians or forced them into a settlement whenever military elite felt that a confrontation would cause a major constitutional or political breakdown.^{xi} Furthermore, Pakistani military while viewing the political class incompetent primarily opposes to any unilateral cut by political leaders in defense expenditure or potential accountability or transparency for the usage of respective funds. The repeated exercises of intervention in politics under various martial laws in Pakistan enabled military elite to accumulate considerable perks and privileges for the institution which now military inevitably wanted to protect along with generally improving service conditions. This developed the need to protect the deviously established economic stakes of Pakistani military through political control. (Siddiqa, 2007, p.109)^{xii}

The role of religion in Pakistan not only remained an important source of creation of an independent state of Muslim in Sub-Continent but also proved to be an integrative force for constructing internal cohesion in Pakistani military. However unlike TAF, Pakistani armed forces did not envisage Islam as countering force to their guardian approach and time to time co-opted with Islamist groups and parties to acquire legitimacy for the military rules. This helped Pakistani military to create new political class by incorporating devolution plans and local government system under military regimes. The military regimes in Pakistan also filtered political class by arranging party less elections (in 1985) and devised selective co-option. The adherence to an ideology based on Islam within Pakistani military is a significant aspect which always served as a justification to its rule. This religious oriented political discourse never faced any significant opposition as Pakistani society is largely homogeneous in the terms of religion which extensively enabled military to define the ideological considerations of Pakistani state while asserting its 'role and rule' (Jahangir and Falki, 2016, pp.48-51).

What is the extent of societal backed constitutional reforms required to demilitarize the politics?

Despite having weak political institutions and legitimacy issues, Turkey emerged as a distinguished case from Pakistan in the terms of its constitutional reforms to enhance the process of democratization. The June 1999 tripartite political coalition paved grounds for the reduction of institutional influence of military^{xiii} as military judges were detached from the security courts of state. Moreover, the compulsion of Secretary General of MGK to be a serving official of Turkish military was also eliminated, which led to the appointment of the first civilian as Secretary General of NSC in 2004 (Jenkins, 2007, p. 346). Nevertheless the prospectus for the European Union (EU) membership for Turkey and comprehensive policy of EU to respect the fundamental human rights as the conditionality for its external relations stimulated the process of constitutional reforms in Turkey in two phases (1987-1995, 1998-2006). These

constitutional alterations largely paved grounds to address the democratic demands of Turkish society.^{xiv} As a result of these constitutional amendments in Turkey specifically in 2001 and 2004, various legislative reforms specifically nine 'Harmonization Packages' were introduced. These reforms were related with the freedom of expression, association, assembly and religion. Furthermore, death penalty was abolished in 2004 and certain reforms were incorporated to prevent torture and mistreatment. The ground-breaking changes were the reforms to secure minority rights by allowing the use of local languages other than Turkish which was further extended through permitting the transmission on public and private channels in different indigenous languages. Moreover, protection of Human rights was assured by the renewal of prosecutions in criminal and civil courts under the constitutional amendment of 2001 in Turkey.

Seventh package of reforms primarily streamlined the civil-military relations by incorporating the changes into the structure and functions of NSC^{xv}. Furthermore, this seventh package established the financial supervision of properties under control of armed forces by the Courts of Accounts. It also provided that in the times of peace, trials on crimes by non-military persons would not be done by military courts (Ozbudan & Genckaya, 2009, pp. 75-78). The democratization process initiated since 2002 in the wake of Turkey's aspiration of joining EU under strong electoral mandate of AKP unlike the past weak political coalitions strengthened the position of political class to further proceed to demilitarize Turkish politics. One of the important steps was 'Ergenekon' Trails under which several retired and active high rank officers of military were arrested and accused of setting up a military coup against the AKP government in its early years.^{xvi} These trails and investigations altered the balance of power of Turkish civil-military relations where Turkish military lost its popular influence to resist the constitutional reform process. (Gursoy, 2014, p. 270). Additionally, Ergenekon trails also provided justification for the constitutional amendment of 2010 which altered the power influence of secular establishment including the judiciary and military.

How society's support to the political class and an altered approach towards civil-military relations in Turkey provided prospects for democratic consolidation and some lessons for Pakistan?

Unlike Pakistan, Turkish society has comparatively a higher rate of education and faster growth in the terms of allocations for scientific studies and research. Despite the significant ideological differences, especially in regard to secular versus Islamist orientations, 80 % of Turks are identified as ethnic Turk while 20 % as Kurds. (Migdolvitz, 2007, p. 14) It has been noted that until the early years of 2000s, there was significant public confidence and trust over the intuition of military among all the social classes and demographics of Turkish society which was primarily higher than other political state institutions (Gursoy, 2012, p. 11). However, in the backdrop of continuity of constitutional reforms in Turkey,

opinion polls in 2002 also provided that almost 70 percent of the Turkish people were in support of EU membership conditioned with civilian control of the military. (Jenkins, 2007, p. 349) It has been observed with reference to certain changes^{xvii} that post-reform period incorporated a paradigm shift into the Turkish societal approach in favor of civilian democracy where military is viewed in secondary position as compared to its political class which also compelled TAF to act to some extent in accordance with such alterations. The Turkish society's determination in the support of its political institutions progressively grew which not only provided challenges to Turkish military elite to redesign its relationship with society, but also made them realize that their future relationship with Turkish society would not be on their terms but on societal demands of democratization and liberal political system. (Aydinli, 2009, pp.581-590) Another signal of societal support to its political class was exhibited on April 16, 2007 when in a referendum, majority of Turkish people voted in the favor of constitutional reforms passed by National Assembly which transformed Turkish parliamentary system into an Executive presidency.^{xviii}

The unsuccessful military coup in 2016 indicated following propensities of the Turkish political system and its society;

- The Turkish people's responses to the military coup in 2016 were unprecedented.^{xix} The failed military coup of 2016 authenticated the changing paradigm that Turkish society preferred to support its political class rather than the military involvement in politics. The Turkish society showed a highly vigilant approach by demonstrating 'Democracy Watch' for at least one month where common people irrespective of their political, ideological and socio-economic differences stood in the streets of cities at nights to prevent any other attempt of coup.(Ataman,2017, p.63)
- There was persisted acknowledgement for some of the democratic measures of AKP government especially during ten years (2002-2013) which enhanced their legitimacy such as rise of civilian authority, neutralizing the role of military in politics, end of segregation of Kurds through their incorporation into polity and religious conservatives^{xx}, letting the political forces sustain like People's Democratic Party (HDP) etc. These democratic reforms provided strong electoral advantages to AKP in particular and political forces in general to strengthen the political process. Furthermore, the decline in absolute poverty in Turkey, especially from 2003-2011 was attributed to the overall increase in economic growth rate (Sekar & Jenkins, 2013, p.29). It has been noted that from 2002 -2007 under AKP government, airports, highways, fast trains and communication channels were built in a great pace. The social and health services were also refurbished which advanced the level of trust over the AKP government (Daily Sabah, 16 August, 2017). It was reported in 2007 that since 2002 under AKP government, the Turkish economy progressed with 7.5 annual growth rate with a huge drop rate of inflation from 60% to 9%. This led to double the per capita income and also brought almost 20\$ billion of foreign investment in 2006 (Migdolvitz,

2007, p.8). The reduction in poverty rates with enhanced economic growth rate and a booming economy by an expanding export market of Turkey can be explained as a factor for gradually advancing the legitimacy of civilian government.^{xxi}

- The responses of various segments of the Turkish state and society were one of the determinant factors for making the coup an unsuccessful attempt in 2016. It has been noted that in the Turkish case of democratic transition, “elite convergence” was the source of such consensus which was largely the result of bridging up the ideological gap through electoral competition. The fifteen constitutional amendments in the post-1983 period in Turkey were primarily result of wide inter-party agreement and negotiations (Ozbudan & Genckaya 2009, pp.113-15). The role of Turkish opposition political parties during the coup of 2016 was commendable for not supporting the coup, despite their political disagreements with President Erdogan and AKP. The opposition political parties primarily refused to replace the legitimate civilian framework with military intervention in support of democracy. The role of Turkish media was also unprecedented during the coup, especially in comparison with its previous position to incite military against the civilian government of Erbakan’s government in 1997. The media rejected the military intervention by public condemnation and asked the state institutions to hold the military network involved in the coup. Additionally, religious establishment utterly supported civilian government and mobilized people through verbal broadcast to stand against the coup. (Ataman, 2017, pp. 260-64)
- The coup attempt of 2016 however was more violent in comparison with the previous military interference in Turkey as almost 250 civilian died and many injured. There is another aspect of civilian resistance to the said coup as Turkish people generally distinguished between the state and government. The coup plotters used fighter jets and helicopters to attack on key state institutions like National Intelligence service (MIT), Police Headquarters, and National Assembly etc. which was viewed by Turkish citizens as attacking the Turkish state (Haugom, 2019, p. 1).
- Though after seven days of attempted military coup of 2016, Turkish General Staff pronounced that only 1.5 % military personnel were part of coup. The post-coup period brought several implications for the TAF and indicated about the deep divisions within the Turkish military officers and weak internal control by the top elite of military over their subordinates. Later, almost 4500 military officers were dismissed from their service. This led to lessen the influence of the TAF in politics and society largely supported Government’s post-coup measures to develop civilian control (Haugom, 2016, p. 4)
- Despite the urge of Turkish Society for strengthening democracy by supporting political institutions, there are potential threats of authoritarian practices by the civilian government of President Tayyip Erdogan due to the transitional nature of Turkish polity as only subordination of

institution of military will not democratize Turkey but it needed the strengthening of political institutions rather than just replacing the secular elite by the Islamist elite and ideology. This also provides that vigilance of society is needed to counter potential authoritarian trends of politics.

Findings

The militaries in Turkey and Pakistan are vigorously identified with the integrity of the respective state and its core values. The national values are often derived from prevailing religious, security (Pakistan) and ideological paradigms (Turkey). The Turkish and Pakistani militaries assumed that their interventions in politics were justified primarily to save the state from inefficient political governments leading to political authoritarianism and incompetence. However, in the Turkish case internal unrest of political Islam was also a significant concern for military whereas in Pakistan, religion remained one of the justifications of military's projected 'National Security State' conception. The political institutions in both countries remained comparatively weak for most years of their existence to take a united front against the military interventions and some of them also provided political co-option to the military rule.

In both cases of Turkey and Pakistan, some international and foreign policy compulsions manifested the direction of civil-military relations however outcomes were apparently contrasting. The role of military in politics of Pakistan was emphasized due to its traditional rivalry with India and continued foreign assistance, especially during the cold war and in post 9/11 scenario. Pakistan became non-NATO ally of USA and frontline state in American war against terrorism, which strengthened the military corporatism whereas in the Turkish case, its interactions with EU for membership emphasized the constitutional reform process which eventually led to the consolidation of democracy.

Conclusion

The failed attempt of the military coup in Turkey in 2016 discarded the general assumption that military coup cannot be resisted in transitional societies. Pakistani society and political class need to understand that an authoritarian political system largely providing a dominant position to military is the root cause of many of its problems. The political conditions would not be changed until or unless there is a shift in societal thinking for viewing military as the ultimate savior. The political class of Pakistan needs to comprehend that to discourage the military intervention in politics; they will have to resolve their political and ethnic disagreements through constitutional and parliamentary means. The Turkish case of 2016 provides that organizational backing of military to the respective coup is the determinant factor of its success which can be offset by demonstrating the political support to representative state institutions like an elected parliament. It is to recognize that civil-military relations can only be balanced in favor of civilians if the political institutions obtain a certain level of legitimacy from the respective society. One of

the significant features of the process of democratic consolidation in any state is the emergence of broadly shared consensus on political framework and constitutional norms. In Pakistan's case, comparatively society and political class both are far away from building such consensus regarding limiting the role of military in politics, however, certain measures can enhance the societal support in the favor of electoral democracy rather than guided democratic setup installed by military regimes. This can be comprised of the ideological underpinning of participatory democracy and pluralism through the education system among Pakistani youth. The political leadership needs to show a united stand against any possibility of military involvement in politics as only an institutional backing like materialization of consensus through an elected Parliament can offset the organizational strength of a military coup. Furthermore, there must be realization on the part of Pakistani society and the political class that the powers of military which are institutionalized throughout the years cannot be lessened at once. The Turkish experience demonstrates that Pakistani political leadership needs to introduce gradual constitutional limits on military powers through parliamentary means. However, in order to do that, they will have to improve governance and economic policies to obtain the trust of Pakistani society otherwise between the two undesirable choices (incompetent civilian government and authoritarian military regime) an entity with organizational potency and force will sustain its control over politics and society of Pakistan.

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ⁱ Objective Civilian Control' as evident in the democracies is largely understood opposite of 'Subjective Civilian Control'; a trait of undemocratic political systems. Objective Civilian Control makes the military a tool for the state while enhancing the military security but minimizing the military power. Subjective civilian control works through civilizing the institution of military while Objective Civilian Control provides limits to the military power by its high level of professionalism where military obeys the civilian elite and political institutions who possess the legitimate power of the state. See for the detail; Huntington, S. 1995."Reforming Civil Society Relations", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol6(4)

ⁱⁱ The military officers under Ottoman Empire largely received western education which made them believe that modern government has to be built on pluralism & democracy; not on the rule of a dynastic Sultan. There were historical instances where Turkish military officers attempted to check the authority of government under Sultan like 'Young Turk Revolt' & in 1908 after the discarding the Constitution of 1876 and Parliament by Sultan Abdul Hamit, which were later reinstated on the pressure of Ottoman military officers. See for detail: Varol.O.O, "The Democratic Coup d'état" *Harvard International Law Journal* Vol 53 (2) 2012.

ⁱⁱⁱ Kemalism was series of radical reforms (1927-1937) introduced by Atatürk as the official state ideology. The intended to politically construct Turkish state on western & secular path by breaking its links to the old Ottoman Empire while believing that Turkey has to be modernized. His most significant part of reforms was separation of

state and religion. Even after the death of Ataturk, military considered itself as the guardian of his six principles of “Republicanism, Populism, Nationalism, Revolutionism, Secularism & Statism” under article 35 of military service law. This also established that any threat to any of these six principles of Kemalism would be viewed as the threat to the Turkish State. See for the detail; Kili, S. (1980). *Kemalism in Contemporary Turkey*. International Political Science Review. Vol.1 (3). PP.381-404. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1601123>

^{iv} In 1940s & 1950s, rural areas in Turkey particularly had limited access to the formal education whereas compulsory military service especially in these areas significantly shaped the mind set of larger portion of Turkish Society in favor of its military. The basic aim of this training was to modernize both soldiers and citizens. Moreover, deployment of soldiers to various regions made them familiar to the variety of Turkish population and this also led to expansion and development of infrastructures in under developed areas.

^v Under the British rule in Sub-Continent, military structures were strongly developed on the bases of ‘Martial Race Theory.’ This theory projected that certain social, ethnic, religious and caste groups are more fit in the terms of their masculine features and potential sense of loyalty for the military service. Various historians explicate that policy of recruitment into military in Sub-continent based on this theory was strongly emphasized in aftermath of War of Independence of 1857. This policy was largely used to potentially exclude the educated and middle classes from military service as they were the main drivers of uprising of 1857. Punjab and North West Frontier Post (Current KPK Province of Pakistan) became few of those regions where recruitment ratio was significantly increased. See for the detail: Roy, Kaushik: *Race and recruitment in the Indian Army, 1880-1918*, in: *Modern Asian Studies* 47/4, 2013, pp. 1310-1347. Also See; Streets-Salter, Heather: *Martial races. The military, race and masculinity in British imperial culture, 1857-1914*, Manchester 2004: Manchester University Press. These trends of recruitment were not changed much in Pakistan as Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Attock remained dominated areas. Despite the fact that Pakistani military is one of the finest army in the terms of internal cohesion and professionalism in South Asia; it is also characterized by an ethnic imbalance as two ethnic groups; Punjabis and Pashtuns are primarily over represented in armed forces. In 2001, Punjabis constituted almost 70 % of the Pakistani however it is reported in 2011 by ISPR (Inter Service Public Relations) that percentage decreased to 57%. For the detail on evolution of Pakistan Army and its various generations, See; Cohen, S.P. 2004. Chapter three. ‘The Army’s Pakistan’ in *The Idea of Pakistan*. The Brookings Institute.

^{vi} The ‘Garrison State’ argument by Lasswell, H.D. (1998) pronounces that security crisis and threats can “subdue civilian and pass powers to Generals”. See for the further detail; *Essays on the Garrison State*, ed. Jay Stanley (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers).

^{vii} MGK was initially established in Turkey in 1961 which provided space to the military leadership to legally convey their concerns & apprehensions to the civilian leaders. Later in 1973, through amendments, MGK was authorized to make recommendations to the civilian government and under the Constitution of 1982, MGK was further strengthened and it was formed into a new body called Presidential Council with the tenure of six years with the authority to evaluate the performance of the legislature, primarily empowered to review legislation on certain matters specifically the martial law or any other issue president may direct. For detail & updated literature on MGK, See; Kaynar, A, K. (2016). ‘Political Activism of National Security Council in Turkey After Reforms’ *Armed Forces & Society*. Vol.43(3). PP. 523-544 <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X16642775>

^{viii} On the bases of Permitter’s classifications, Siddiq (2007) expounds that until 1961 Turkey and until 1977, Pakistan can be categorized as ‘Arbitrator Type’ of military. In this type, military obtains direct control but avoids extending its rule. Military views itself as the source of balance between the competing political forces. Such types of militaries used to play the role of ‘Watchdog’ for the alleged corruption of the politicians. To get detail that why these types of militaries don’t stay in power for longer period of time, see; pp.47-51. She further elaborates that there are three cases of Turkey, Indonesia and Pakistan where ‘arbitrator’ military turned into ‘Parent-Guardian Type’. The significant reason was the growing economic interests of these militaries which needed to institutionalize their political power.

^{ix} These internal threats primarily stemmed from Islamic movements and Kurdish separatism.

^x ISPR is media wing of Pakistani military which provides news and information about armed forces largely broadcasting its views on different issues through its social media pages especially on Face book and Twitter.

^{xi} See for the further detail on rise of military as the most powerful state institution in Pakistan; Ahmed, I. 2013. *Pakistan the Garrison State: Origins, Evolution, and Consequences 1947-2011*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. Jalal, A. 1999. “The State of Martial Law: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defense. Also See; Rizvi,

H.A. 2003."Military, State and Society in Pakistan". See: Nawaz's. 2008." Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army and the War Within", Karachi Oxford University Press.

^{xii} Siddiqa (2007) provides an insight of 'Milbus' which refers to the Pakistani military capital largely utilized for the personal benefits of the institution of military and financial autonomy of the organization. It makes military officers more interested in augmenting their influences in the decision making and politics of Pakistani state. What's makes this 'Milbus' different from other countries like USA,UK or even Cuba, China , Iran that in Pakistan, its neither part of defense budget nor recorded and primarily does not come under scope of accountability of state procedures. It involves the profit-making and commercial ventures of Pakistani military and personal stakes of members of armed forces, defense establishment.

^{xiii} The Copenhagen conference criteria pushed the process of reforms in Turkey as it demanded that military as institution should be subordinate to the political institutions. The powers of MGK were also declined by alteration into the article 118 of the Turkish constitution which made it only as an advisory body. Turkish Parliament also increased the number of civilians in MGK by including deputy prime ministers & justice ministers. Furthermore, after the amendment, Turkish Council of Ministers was no more bound to give priority consideration to the MGK recommendations as only obligation of Council was to notify them.

^{xiv} For the detailed analysis of constitutional amendments in Turkey from 1987-1994 and 1998-2006; see Ozbudan, Ergun & Genckaya, Omer Faruk, (2009) "Democratization & Politics of Constitution-Making in Turkey" pp. 31-72, Central European University Press, Budapest.

^{xv} See for the details: Article 24,25,26,27 & 28 of the Seventh package of reforms.

^{xvi} In June 2007, Turkish police found the links of a deep state terrorist network 'Ergenekon Terrorist Organization' where several active and retired officers of Turkish military (Almost 350) as well as some of businessman, journalists, academicians etc were involved in an attempt to overthrow the AKP government in 2003. See for the further detail; Susoy, O.K. "Civil-military Relations and Authoritarianism in Turkey: 2007-2017" Master Thesis, International Studies. <https://studenttheses.universiteitleiden.nl/handle/1887/53168>

^{xvii} As a result of Parliamentary elections of 2001 in Turkey, pro-Islamist AKP secured significant electoral support. AKP altogether secured 11 successive electoral victories ranging from national, local, presidential elections and referendum. Furthermore, increasing share of votes for AKP in general elections from 34.3 % in 2002 to 49.5 % in 2015 also indicated the trust level and acknowledgement for democratic reforms of civilian governments in Turkey. The respective government while altering the constitution incorporated changes (like permitting women to wear headscarves into Universities) which seemed contradictory to military's long standing secular approach. However due to the societal support to the civilian government policies, military despite its clear opposition to the alteration avoided intervention.

^{xviii} Almost 68.95 % people voted yes to the changes which also lessened the tenure of presidency from seven to five years and elections intervals four years instead of 5 years. See for the detail of Referendum in Turkey; Results of previous constitutional referendums in Turkey. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/results-of-previous-constitutional-referendums-in-turkey--112082>

^{xix} Even before the call of Turkish President Erdogan, millions of people from different ages, educational, economic & political background came on roads while carrying Turkish flags in their hands. In order to prevent military coup, they rushed to government buildings including police Headquarters, airports and bridges on Bosphorus while facing machine guns, tanks, helicopters & Planes.

^{xx} The AKP used to refer its democratic reforms as 'Silent Revolution' where legally structured segregation measures & group inequalities of Turkish Republic were abolished. It provided the notion of equal citizenship by elevating the status of ethnic-linguistic minorities and religious conservatives in Turkey which made them significant electoral majority in the support of political process in Turkey.

^{xxi} The cases of long term military disengagement from politics like Greece, Portugal, Spain & France provided that reduction in poverty trends & equitable distribution of income enhanced the legitimacy of civilian rules of these states. See for the further detail; C.P .Danopoulos, 'Democratizing the Military: Lessons from Mediterranean Europe', West European Politics, Vol 14(4) (1991), PP. 25-41. Furthermore, it has been observed that generally weak economic conditions while leading to political instability increase the risk for military coups as low income in less developed states can trigger the political uncertainty which is mentioned as 'Coup Trap'. See for the further detail; Paul Collier, 2007, 'The Bottom Billion: Why the poorest countries are Failing What Can Be Done about it'' Oxford: Oxford University Press; Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, 'Military Spending & Risk of Coups d 'Etat. For Pakistan see; Ibrahim, "Guarding the State or Protecting the Economy" The Economic Factors of Pakistan, Military Coups.