

## China-Pakistan Defense Cooperation: Critical Analysis

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**Abstract** - *China has become Pakistan's largest defense supplier and the last decade witnessed an increase in cooperation between the two governments in matters relating to defense. But these relations are not new, rather have a long history. After laying the foundation of diplomatic relations in 1950s, military assistance between the two countries began in 1966 leading to the formation of a strategic alliance in 1972. China provided military support and assistance to Pakistan during a crucial time in 1966 when USA imposed an embargo on military sales. The Chinese aided Pakistan by providing military equipment for two divisions of the army and MIG aircraft for the air force. The Heavy Industries Taxila was also set up with Chinese assistance in 1971. Being a Pilot project initially, the HIT is now supplying heavy equipment to the army such as Tank Al-Khalid and Tank Al-Zarar. Pakistan Navy designed the PNS Shujaat, the first of its kind to be built in Karachi, in 1999 with support from China. The collaboration on the development of JF-17, an aircraft deal worth \$5 billion, signifies the growing trust and support between the two neighboring countries. Examining the Pak-China relationship on defense highlights that Chinese support to Pakistan and its defense needs has been consistent and Chinese have shown immense interest in helping Pakistan to modernize its defense capabilities. With bilateral relationship spanning over decades, Pakistan views China as its closest ally and friend in the region. A trusted partner, China is now the most reliable source of attaining military hardware and technology for Pakistan in addition to numerous other projects.*

**Keywords:** Alliances, China, Containment Policy, Multidimensional Cooperation, Nuclear Capability, SEATO, Strategic Partnership

## Introduction

As like the balance of power convention, the beginning of alliance formation backs as well, to antequate times. The alliance together is the outer face and a critical part of the balance of power. Like different precepts of the neorealist, collusions guarantee the states' survival too. In the expressions of Michael W. Simon: "Security concerns impact the decision of alliance goals ". Normally those states will align together against dangers that have common interests. Indeed, even it is workable for allies; usually, when a great power and powerless nation are partners to have basic joined perspectives on one hand and disparate perspectives on the other. Pakistan's alliance with the United States delineates this conduct. At the point when the U.S. and Pakistan signed their Mutual Assistance Agreement, SEATO, and CENTO, they had basic enthusiasm for their organization together to get by, to end the spread of communism. The United States actualized the "Containment Policy".

The America had seen its control methodology from the global perspective, to square both of the Soviet and Chinese communists. Despite the fact that Pakistan was dreaded of the Soviet Union because of the last's alignment with India, however, was not helpless against Chinese socialism. Pakistan and the United States had to stand out one common intrigue; the Soviet Union. Pakistan defined its alliance policy all the more locally, to prevent India. In the 1950s, China excessively adjusted herself to the Soviet Union against the United States. The United States, Soviet Union, and India additionally have been examined here due to the complex changing partnerships' examples in South Asia, which have constantly left impacts on the Sino - Pakistan relations.

"Amid the Cold War, the three major powers the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) - were often torn by the yearning to make alliances meaningful while in the meantime carrying on even-mindedly shielding against would-be foes. The outcome has been a series of often shocking alignments. (Zhao, 1996) The U.S. - Pakistan alliance had confronted this issue. The United States was worried about the PRC and USSR in the sixties and later only the USSR. But, Pakistan's fundamental threat was India. The Sino - Soviet split happened because of the Soviet détente with the United States in the 1960s. Hence it can be said that alliances together are not a marriage of love but rather marriages of convenience. This obligation of the alliance can be made and split away effectively. Each state serves its own

interests. At the point when the states' interests change, the alliance also gets to be hard to survive. (Goldstein J. S., International Relations, 2005)

### **A Deepening Military Bond**

China's role as a major arms supplier for Pakistan started in the 1960s and included help with building various arms processing plants in Pakistan and supplying complete weapons frameworks. "Until around 1990," write South Asia specialists Elizabeth G. M. Parker and Teresita C. Schaffer in a July 2008 "Beijing obviously looked to develop Pakistan to keep India off balance" After the 1990 imposition of U.S. sanctions on Pakistan, China turned into the country's leading arms supplier. Cooperation now incorporates personnel training, joint military exercises, intelligent sharing, and counterterrorism efforts. While the relationship is not exactly balanced, it has been basically critical to Pakistan. "Pakistan needs China more than China needs Pakistan," says Huang Jing, a China expert at the National University of Singapore. Pakistan has profited from China's help with the following defense capacities:

- **Missile:** Pakistan's armed force has both short-and medium-range ballistic missiles, for example, the Shaheen missile series, that specialists say are modifications of Chinese imports.
- **Aircraft:** The present fleet of the Pakistani Air Force incorporates Chinese interceptor and advanced trainer aircraft, and additionally an Airborne Early Warning and Control radar system used to identify aircrafts. Pakistan is preparing the JF-17 Thunder multi-role combat aircraft together with China. The K-8 Karakorum light assault aircraft was also coproduced.
- **Nuclear Program:** China supplies Pakistan with nuclear technology and help, including what numerous specialists suspect was the blueprint for Pakistan's atomic bomb. Some news reports propose Chinese security offices knew about Pakistani exchanges of atomic technology to Iran, North Korea, and Libya. China was additionally blamed for having long-standing ties with Abdul Qadeer Khan (A.Q. Khan), known as the father of the Pakistani atomic program. (Snyder, The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics, 1984)

There are 22 noteworthy projects that China has started in Pakistan, for example, heavy mechanical complex, heavy electrical complex, tank rebuilding factory, aircraft reconstructing factory, machine tools, Gwadar port, Karakorum Highway and nuclear power plants. What's more, right now there are more than 120 smaller Chinese projects and around 12,000 to 15,000 Chinese engineers and experts are working in Pakistan on these projects and more are landing by the day. So as to viably channel this collaboration, however, it is extremely important to synchronize these efforts and develop proper industrial zones. (Kashif, 2012)

Furthermore, the region is increasingly coming together in a 'new regionalism' driven by economy and energy. In May 2013, President Xi Jinping declared the significance of this new regionalism and the Central Asian Economic Past at Astana, Kazakhstan. There is already a pipeline from Myanmar to China and from Kazakhstan to China; new pipelines, roads, and infrastructure are also being developed with Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (TAPI), and there is obviously the pending Iran-Pakistan pipeline too. The economic restoration of Pakistan, the resolution of its energy crisis and its security and stability are in this manner specifically connected with China Gwadar - The distance from Gwadar to Shanghai is 3000 miles, while the distance to Shanghai from the Melaka strait is 9000 miles. This imperative port can be used as an energy corridor and for expanding bilateral interaction. (Ehsanullah, 2009-10)

## Challenges

Systemic issues or social thoughts which are developing in China are immeasurably misjudged in Pakistan, where China is viewed as a basically communist nation, at some level of transition. In the West and maybe even in China itself, however, the system is seen as an improved variant of capitalism – a blend of communist and capitalist thoughts. Understanding this is basic for moving two-sided relations. Strategic relations are all together, however, trade relations linger long ways behind, and are not proportionate to different sectors of the relationship. (Jalalzai, 2006)

The absence of trust, especially as to Chinese items in Pakistan, is another issue in this regard, as the quality of Chinese products is viewed as sketchy. This is also a snag to enhancing trade relations. Implementation mechanisms are an additional challenge. While to date there are about 358 Joint Agreements, MoUs, Joint Declarations and game plans covering each sector of civil

society, the absence of political will and execution has failed to completely materialize these tries. The security situation in Pakistan adds to challenges in both trade relations and execution issues. Especially with regards to the Pakistan-China Economic Corridor, Gilgit-Baltistan and Baluchistan are the two essentially important territories, with lamentably the worst security issues. Fundamental issues between both nations must be tended to, particularly with regards to concurred national needs. The absence of coordination between different divisions is bringing about perplexity and preventing successful and timely implementation. Constrained people to-people communication, restricted Chinese art, and literature are keeping the relationship marginally one-dimensional. (Yahuda, 1983)

### **External Pressures**

With the ascent of China, the center is moving from west to east, even the U.S. has adopted the new policy of 'pivot Asia' and 'rebalancing'. This implies economic and political center has moved to Asia-Pacific, and militarily 60 percent of American naval force is presently concentrating on this region, and India is a strategic ally in this regard. There is also discussion of the restoration of the Cold War mindsets in the shape of China. Last time there was such a discussion in 1969 when Brezhnev introduced his 'Asian Collective Security Plan'. Presently, it appears to be some anterooms in America are attempting to restore that mindset; whether they have a political limit or will to do it is of secondary importance.

There are also global pressures on China, the fault lines for which are amassed in the area. The Dalai Lama is in India using the Tibetan card, and other people who are playing the Islamic Xinjiang card against China given the situation there. (TableReport-IV, 2014) Military assistance is looked for the defense of territorial frontiers and not for the liquidation of those frontiers. The 17-Day War with India showed the risks of military help rendered for purposes other than the country's own particular objects. If the support was not to be utilized against Indian hostility, it was certainly not adequate to meet the risk from China or the Soviet Union, if such a danger existed. In such a possibility, it was to be accepted that the United States would step into the conflict if needed with ultimate weapons. Whatever degree ultimate weapons would be utilized has still to be seen. In any case, it would be a poor reassurance to the people of Pakistan if their country were to be safeguarded by nuclear destruction. The essence and substance of military support lay not in meeting Indian animosity, but rather in defense of the Soviet Union and China.

In one occasion the assistance was not to be utilized, and in the other, it was not adequate to keep the complete demolition of the nation.

Considering the objective conditions of Asia, It appears that China alone is in a position to manage a doctrine for Asia, in the event that one should be needed so. If there can be a Monroe Doctrine for the Americans and Western Europe, and if there is to be a Brezhnev Doctrine for Eastern Europe, it is not incomprehensible that later on there may be a Mao-Tse-tung Doctrine for Asia. Such a tradeoff can come if the three Great Powers implicitly acknowledge each other's area of influence. The Potsdam Conference demonstrates that such agreements are not freely conceded. In the first instance, they include mental compromise. After a time of serious struggle and confrontation, war and recrimination, a time comes for submission for realities. When it gets to be clear that more is impossible to further national interests without complete catastrophe, which is the stage for tacit readjustments. This is the thing that happened in the immense encounter between the Soviet Union and the United States, and, hundreds of years before that, amongst Islam and Christianity.

Fierce rivalries between the equivalents rarely reach a critical stage. They blur away, are consigned to lack of definition or supplanted by new rivalries. New difficulties are met with new reactions. This doesn't imply that the people of the world will need a permanent status quo implied by big Powers. In the modern meaning of the term, a circle of impacts does not mean the creation of an empire or a dominion, nor does it mean the control of one Great Power to the exclusion of others. Even inside a de-restricted circle, there is space for co-operation, yet not for a contention. It implies that a hostile bridge head can't be allowed presence against a Great Power in the areas of its geographical propinquity. This implies nothing detrimental might be done to imperil the interest of the Great Powers inside its range and that the guidelines of peaceful coexistence and non-interference in the internal affairs of all nations, large and small, should be entirely implemented.

The conditions in the Soviet Union are not the same as those of the past. A return to that past can't be made, either in the Soviet Union or in the countries of Eastern Europe. The liberal patterns of Czechoslovakia won't wind down. People will keep on hankering for a change in Western Europe. There will be a huge pressure. There will be financial and military actuations and there will be dangers. Cordial countries will be placed on the front line to proliferate the

idea. There will be an amalgam of pressure and enticements from all directions. Whatever the heaviness of pressure, regardless of from where it comes, it is imperative for Pakistan to oppose resolutely any activity against China. The troubles will pass, yet in the event that Pakistan succumbs to collective pressure, national interest will be harmed permanently and maybe debilitate the very existence of Pakistan. (Ali, 2001)

The proposed Security Alliance will be a multilateral military combination carrying all the perils connected with such alliances, all the hazards so as perceived to Pakistan. The arrangement of collective security alliances has prompted tensions. Regardless of the possibility that the system had any utility previously, it doesn't possess any point of interest for future. Whenever SEATO and CENTO have failed in the past, another alliance can't succeed in the coming years. The grouping will bring about responses. It will strain our inner structure and invite the vilest types of outer interference. (Walsh, 30 November 2010)

It feels strange that the Soviet Union ought to support an alliance repulsive to Marxist-Leninist philosophy and against Soviet state policy. Before, the Soviet Union always opposed multilateral military collusions. Afghanistan was extravagantly commended by the Soviet Union for terminating such alliances. Presently the Soviet Union needs Afghanistan to be the venue for the promotion of a similar alliance. For more than two decades, the Soviet Union has undauntedly opposed the western systems of collective security alliances. In a memorandum of March 31, 1949, tended to the countries of the Atlantic Alliance, the Soviet Union communicated serious criticism against multilateral military alliances. The memorandum rejected in advance of the time the Western criticism of the Soviet system by expressing: "All the Soviet Union's treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with the countries of people's democracy have a bilateral character."

On March 31, 1949, when the Soviet Union offered the memorandum toward the Western Powers, all the treaties of the Soviet Union with Eastern European countries were of a bilateral character and aimed against Germany. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 14, 1950, was also bilateral and it was directed against Japan. The treaties were not only bilateral as well as they were limited to the aggressors of the Second World War. This privilege was contained in Article 107 of the Charter of the United Nations which states: "Nothing in the present Charter should nullify or block action in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been a foe

of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having obligation regarding such actions." (Sattar A. , 2007)

The Soviet Union went so far in its observation of collective security alliance as to thwart to members from claiming the United Nations the privilege to close ahead of time plans for collective self-defense. The Soviet memorandum expressed this in the following terms: "Nor can the foundation of the northern Atlantic group of States be legitimized by the privilege of each member from the United Nations, to an individual or collective self-defense as per Article 51 of the Charter. Suffice it to say that such a privilege in accordance with United Nations' Charter can just emerge in case of an armed assault on a member of the organization, while, as is universally known, neither the United States nor Great Britain nor France nor alternate members in the Pact is undermined with any armed hostility."

The Soviet memorandum went further to claim that the Atlantic Pact was not a regional course of action which could be concluded as per Article 52 of the Charter: "There can be no doubt of any regional nature of this Treaty, since the alliance conceived by it embraces States in both sides of the equator of the World and it is not with the end goal of settling any territorial questions. This is also affirmed by the way that as has already been declared, States which are not members of the United Nations - Italy and Portugal, are being attracted into support a North Atlantic Treaty, in spite of the fact that Article 52 of the U.N. Contract conceives only the conclusion of regional understandings among members from the United Nations." Regardless of how capable a combination is set into movement; China is not going to forsake her fundamental interests in her sphere of influence. Pakistan will need to oppose the weights and sit tight for an adjustment in the global circumstance. That change is definitely coming, and not in the far off future either. Whatever the immediate issues, the future course in Asia can't be settled without China's participation and to China's detriment.

If India had not forced a monetary boycott soon after independence, Pakistan's economy may have still stayed at the sufferance of India. What does regional co-operation involve? If it implies cooperation beyond normal trade and business intercourse, including reconciliation of financial aspects and the end of tariff barriers, it would offer ascent to numerous challenges. Here in our undeveloped locale –with critic economic situations, parallel financial matters, and abnormal state of unemployment, frail monetary forms, and low wages –the issues of coordination will

bring about major problems. If that the development of territorial co-operation past typical monetary action is to be steady, in so far as India is concerned, it can await the result of the settlement of our disputes. Pakistan is as now a day involved with regional co-operation with Iran and Turkey. Pakistan ought to be very prepared to embrace comparable co-operation with Afghanistan. Subsequently, if regional co-operation is to be free of collective security collusion, and not as its harbinger, it can be considered by Pakistan with every one of the nations in the area aside from India. The joint effort with India can take after the settlement of the disputes it is not a pre-condition to a military cooperation poised against China. In the event that it is to be a phase in the improvement of a military coordinated effort, it can't be acknowledged, regardless of the possibility that monetary bounties stream out of it or regardless of the fact that it comes after the settlement of India-Pakistan disputes. Being coordinated against China it will spell debacle.

A foreign policy cast in the vision of the future will overcome all obstacles and give the people of Pakistan the peace they have sought but which has been denied them since their independence. This is one of the moments that history provides for a decision. After Chamberlain capitulated to Hitler at Munich in 1938, Churchill said: "The Government had to choose between shame and war. They choose shame and they will get war." Pakistan has a wider choice. In rejecting the collective security alliance and unconditional regional co-operation, Pakistan might face momentary difficulties but she would have served her long term interests and strengthened the case for peace in Asia. If Pakistan succumbs, the people will face a terrible tragedy, escaping neither shame nor war.

### **Military Aid for Pakistan**

"To help Pakistan's defense capability after the United States embargoed military sales, China agreed, in 1966, to provide equipment for two divisions of the army as well as MIG aircraft for the air force. It also gave \$60 million for development assistance in 1965, a further \$40 million in 1969 and \$200 million for the next five-year plan. " China also supported Pakistan during 1971 war between India and Pakistan, and it was also the fact that at that time china was such a country which provided military aid to Pakistan. This was the time when Russian arms supply to India was continued, due to this reason the military imbalances were widened between India and Pakistan, so Pakistan also needed a military aid, because after the general election of 1970 which were won by Awami National Party of Shaikh Mujeeb-ur-Rehman the political

crises increased in Pakistan, not only this but at that time Pakistan was suffering from other “political issues of international importance such as those of separatism, East Pakistani displaced persons, foreign intervention, and external armed aggression.” (Haider)

### **Pakistan: Dependent on Chinese Support**

Even nowadays Pakistan is also suffering from internal as well as external problems, external problems indicate the Kashmir issue with India. China always respected the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Pakistan and highlighted the role of Pakistan in maintaining peace in the region and efforts solving problems through negotiations not by war or aggression. Pakistan became the capable of manufacturing jet fighters in September 2003 and it was the first time when JF-17 was manufactured by the joint efforts of Pakistan and China, this fighter plane was tested in China, this fighter plane has the capabilities of Mirage 2000 as well as F-7 fighter planes, one of from the main characteristics of this fighter plane is that it can be used to attack in any weather.

The relations between Pakistan and China were further increased in November 2003 when General Musharraf visited Beijing, moreover, “China’s financial assistance to Pakistan in many projects like Chashma Nuclear Plant, Gwadar Port, Machine Tool Factor and Heavy Mechanical Complex at Taxila are a few examples.” “On the military front development of JF-17 Thunder jet fighter speaks of the trust and understanding between the two great neighbors”. During a visit to Beijing Pervez Musharraf also shared his views on national and international issues with Chinese leaders. Furthermore, leaders from china also assured that “It (china) will help Pakistan in the completion of important projects, something at which Pakistan is not very good. There is big money linked to some very important projects with Chinese cooperation. For instance, there is the JF-17 fighter aircraft deal worth as much as \$5 billion”.

Pakistan turned into the fit for assembling plane warriors in September 2003 and it was the first time when JF-17 was produced by the joint endeavors of Pakistan and China, this military aircraft was tried in China, this military aircraft has the abilities of Mirage 2000 and in addition F-7 military aircraft, one of from the primary qualities of this military aircraft is that it can be utilized to assault in any climate. (Sattar, 2010) The relations amongst Pakistan and China were further expanded in November 2003 when General Musharraf went to Beijing, besides, "China's

budgetary help to Pakistan in numerous activities like Chashma Nuclear Plant, Gwadar Port, Machine Tool Factor and Heavy Mechanical Complex at Taxila are a couple of illustrations."

### **Multidimensional Cooperation**

In January 2012, the Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan underscored the country's strategic importance by declaring it 'the fulcrum of Asia'. In the last decade, the areas of cooperation between China and Pakistan have evolved and been re-prioritized. Significantly, China only began taking more of an interest in Pakistan's internal security after 9/11 and has since deepened security. Pakistan President Yahya Khan arranged for Kissinger to take a secret 4 am flight from Islamabad to Beijing to begin the normalization of relations. Pakistan and China are teaming up in various segments, particularly resistance, exchange and formative and vitality division. Since the 1960s, China has been an essential supplier of military merchandise to Pakistan. The JF-17 Thunder is the lobby sign of this safeguard participation. Other than that both nations have teamed up in building up weapons manufacturing plants, China has given specialized help with enhancing and modernizing existing offices. Both nations have likewise collaborated in an atomic vitality division and have sorted out joint military activities and officers from both nations go to courses at military foundations.

In a speech conveyed during his visit to Pakistan in 2006 President Hu Jintao illustrated five multi-dimensional of China's 'multi-dimensional' association with Pakistan:

- extending strategic collaboration and consolidating conventional fellowship,
- extending 'win-win' business ties,
- extending cultural and social exchanges and reinforcing the premise of friendship,
- reinforcing collaboration in international affairs and maintaining common interests, and
- elevating exchanges among human advancements to upgrade world harmony.

The 2005 'Pakistan-China Treaty for Friendship and Cooperation and Good Neighborly Relations' is promoted as a key instrument to fortify strategic, monetary and social relations. Of these, strategic collaboration, particularly around counter-terrorism, and improving economic cooperation are the center drivers of the Sino-Pakistani relations.

## Issues of Convergence amongst China and Pakistan

Pakistan and China both share security, military, and financial concerns. Advancing and reinforcing conventional and agreeable relations with China is an essential component of Pakistan's foreign strategy from the security point of view. China and Pakistan have common discernments on the worldwide situation and worldwide strategic trends. China is the main significant force that shares Pakistan's concerns with respect to Indian territorial aspirations. Both have concerns with respect to India's atomic strategy. Pakistan completely supports China's vision of the multipolar world. Both support a simply fair global economic order and change of the worldwide monetary related system. In spite of the fact that a littler country, Pakistan rivals India in conventional weapons. Most importantly, it has engaged 500,000 to 700,000 Indian troops in the Kashmir Valley for as far back as fifteen years. By keeping hundreds and a huge number of Indian troops occupied with Kashmir, Pakistan in an indirect way facilitates India's challenge to China's border on their debated outskirts. Given the truth of India-Pakistani suspicion and antagonistic vibe, a strong Pakistan implies that India must keep the greater part of its military sent on its western fringe.

### Pakistan: a Risky ally for China?

Pakistan's geographical position is of key strategic importance to China. However, the areas of economic and security cooperation demonstrate the limitations of political goodwill between the two countries. A stable Pakistan benefits China in securing its national security interests in Xinjiang but Pakistan's deteriorating domestic traditional and non-traditional security conditions have tested Islamabad's own capacity to protect Beijing's interests and to contain the fallout of the volatility within its borders. The current situation has exposed Islamabad's limitations in terms of helping deliver stability in Xinjiang and protecting Chinese investments and assets in Pakistan. (Private sector cooperation with China stressed, 2011)

While China supports Pakistan in international multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, when it comes to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) it is not a tale of 'brothers sharing weal and woe'. Pakistan currently has observer status at the SCO and in June 2012 made further overtures to be admitted as a permanent member. Even though China currently holds the presidency, and Russia has voiced no objection to Pakistan and India joining

as permanent members, their membership is still pending. China's apparent reluctance to admit its long-term ally to the SCO is another example of Pakistan's domestic terrorism and militancy problems hindering its ability to position itself strategically in regional organizations. A key concern for the SCO includes non-proliferation, on which Pakistan has a poor record following the discovery of the illicit procurement network that was set up by its leading nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan. (Hussain, 1974)

### **Defense Relations (2001-2013)**

An Overview of the Current Bilateral Diplomatic Ties On April 5 2005, Islamabad and Beijing signed "Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Collaboration" which stated "each Contracting Party shall not join any alliance or bloc which infringes upon the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other Contracting Party, nor shall it take any action of this nature including the conclusion of treaties of this nature with a third country". On the same day, both countries signed ten other documents related to bilateral cooperation which, inter alia, included the Cooperation on Fighting against Terrorism, Separatism and Radicalism, the Agreement on common issues like Customs, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, the Agreement on Financial and Technical Collaboration and the "Early Harvest" plan of Bilateral Free Trade Agreement. (China embassy, April 06, 2013)

Moreover, in November 2006, the president of China Hu Jintao visited Pakistan on the invitation of General Pervez Musharraf, the President of Pakistan. During this tour, 18 new agreements were signed between two countries (China ECCO, December 21, 2006). It was commented that friendly relations and collaboration between two countries became a fine example generally for 3rd world countries and particularly for regional countries. (Bhutto, 1977) Premier of China, Wen Jiabao, visited Pakistan in 2010. It was the first visit of any high ranking official since President Hu Jintao visited Pakistan in 2006. Before Wen's address to Parliament of Pakistan, the audiences resounded in loud and clear voice enchanting the slogan of "Long live Pakistan-China friendship (Khan, December 20, 2010).

Wen started his speech with "Assalam o Alaikum Bhayio". (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, December 19, 2010) He mentioned that "You say in Pakistan, "A good neighbor is a blessing." We say in China, "A close neighbor means more than a

distant relative." While talking about terrorism, he said "Pakistan is at the forefront of the international counter-terrorism campaign. It has paid a heavy price and made important contributions. This is a well-known fact. The international community must fully recognize and support Pakistan's efforts and truly respect Pakistan's independent choice of the development path. The fight against terrorism should not be linked with any particular religion or ethnic group and there should be no double standards."

He further stressed that collectively the indications and root causes of terrorist elements should be eliminated from its basis. The Chinese approach and position on this question were crystal clear. According to him, they were willing to make diligent efforts and strengthen coordination and collaboration with Pakistan and global community. The Prime Minister of Pakistan announced that the Parliament of Pakistan will celebrate the year 2011 as the friendship year with China. During that tour, seventeen treaties, four MoUes, and a combined project were signed in major areas of cooperation. The contract for operation between Pakistan Space Institution (SUPARCO) and China Space Administration (CNSA) was also signed. The deals concluded during the tour worth almost \$35 billion. In May 2011, Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani paid a four-day visit to China and met there with Chinese President and Prime Minister. The said visit had two important aspects: first was to elaborate 60 years of diplomatic relation between two countries while the other was to discuss the situation emerged after the death of Al Qaeda's head Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad on May 2.

In the backdrop of Mr. Gillian's visit, the spokesperson of Foreign Ministry of China, Mr. Jiang Yu addressed a press briefing. Responding to information's that China had said the US to respect the sovereignty Pakistan after the BinLaden's death operation, Spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Jiang Yu reiterated Beijing's unconditional insist that the "sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan must be respected." (Aziz, 2013)

### **Cooperation in Nuclear Sector**

Pak-China cooperation in the nuclear sector was started in 1996 during the visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin to Pakistan. In that visit, China made an agreement to build a nuclear reactor in Pakistan. (Narayanan, Oct 24, 1999) The subsequent completion of 300 MW Chashma Nuclear Power Plant in 2000 was a new milestone in nuclear relations between Pakistan and China. (Haq, April 11, 2005) Although the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) had signed an agreement for the export of a 300 MW nuclear power plant to Pakistan in 1991 but its commercial operation started in 2000. The successful functioning of Chashma Nuclear Power Plant was an excellent manifestation of south-south cooperation.(Ibid) Since 10 February 2006, China is also constructing a 96 MW Hydropower Project at Jinnah Barrage located very near to Chashma which was initially expected to be completed in October 2013 but is still in progress.(Wapda, 14 August 2014).

### **Defense Cooperation**

In the field of defense, another landmark was achieved in 2001 in the shape of MBT-2000 i.e. Al-Khalid Tank. A development deal between Pakistan and China regarding Al-Khalid Tank was signed in 1990 while the Tank was delivered to Pakistan Army in 2001. Al-Khalid was equitably lightweight as compared to other modern tanks. It was equipped with an Inertial Navigation System (INS) and a Satellite Navigation System (GPS). Other modern equipment was installed in that tank such as active thermal burn producer, inner fervor extinguisher, explosion-suppression system and laser finding structure. Many countries expressed interest in purchasing that tank while Bangladesh Army ordered 44 MBT-2000. (Nixon, 1972)

Pakistan required newfangled combatant to substitute its armada of old Mirage III/5s, Chengdu F-7s, and Nanchang A-5s. Islamabad and Beijing signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 1995 for cooperative project and expansion of a new fighter which would have to be completed within next few years. That target accomplished in the shape of JF-17 Thunder (FC-1 Fierce Dragon) in 2007. It was the joint-ventured multi-role fighter jet developed by Pakistan and China. Although the first test flight of JF-17 Thunder was made in May 2006 during the visit of Pakistan Air Chief to China but it was formally rolled out in 2007. The launching ceremony regarding the construction plan of the multi-role combatant airplane was held in Kamra. General Pervez Musharraf told there that it would help Pakistan in

strengthening its Air Force and would substitute the old fleet of Mirage plane of Pakistan in 2015. Its 1<sup>st</sup> squadron was initiated in the Pakistan Air Force. It had a single engine and was light in weight multipurpose warplane as compared to other devices of similar nature.

In 2009, Pakistan got the first frigate F-22p named PNS Zulfiqar from China. Pakistan had been negotiating with China for the provision of 4 frigates since the late 1990s. But the agreement was signed between both countries in 2006 when the negotiations for financing and transfer of technology had been finalized. That \$750 million contract also included anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters as well as ammunition for the frigates. According to the contract, the first three were being constructed at the Hooding Songhua Shipyard in Shanghai, China while the last was manufacturing in Pakistan by Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works (KSEW) to be accomplished in 2013. That cooperation further enhanced the defense relations between the two countries. (Bhutto Z. A., 1967)

Pakistan and China started the joint naval exercise in Karachi in 2003. It was for the first time that the Chinese Navy conducted a joint maritime exercise with any foreign navy. The exercise included the joint search & rescue operations, patrolling and searching for suspected intruders. As Pakistan came closer to China, India extended its naval relations with Russia and held joint maneuvers in October at India's Visakhapatnam Port during the INDRA-05 exercise. (China mail, February 13, 2013) A Joint Sino-Pakistan Military Drill named YOUYI (Friendship) was started in July 2011. Both countries pointed that the purpose of these exercises was basically to eradicate terrorism in the region. The joint exercises were extended over a period of two weeks intended at the common exchange of experiences and information through an inclusive training program in real time. The YOUYI-IV exercise was a Brigade level joint exercise between the two armed forces in which Special Forces from both sides participated. Chinese Army, being well-equipped and highly technical in nature, was very scrupulous, enthusiastic and evenly proficient in its approach. During the previous joint exercise in China (2009), they established a high sense of professionalism and acquaintance towards Pakistan. (Yousaf, November 15, 2011)

### **Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)**

In recent past, Pakistan announced that it would obtain armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) from China. Some details of the deal were revealed. China indicated that the UAV it offered

could use several missiles, especially the Blue Arrow 7 and HJ-10 that were identical in size and performance to the American Hellfire. China had also been offering a UAV of similar shape, weight, and performance as the US Predator called CH-4; that UAV was similar in shape to the larger American MQ-9 Reaper. The UAV would be able to carry a pair of Blue Arrow 7 missiles. Perhaps Pakistan was just waiting for some successful field tests before buying these technologies. (The News, November 25, 2013)

Over the last five years, Pakistan had used several types of UAVs along the Afghan and Indian borders. The most efficient of these was the Italian Falco UAV which Pakistan had purchased six years ago. The said UAV could be taken off and landed on an air-strip and a catapult or parachute could be used for its take-off and landing. Pakistan had been using various Chinese UAVs for the previous decade or so. The 207 model had the maximum endurance of eight hours, but more generally was an endurance of four hours. Maximum range from the control van was 150 kilometers away and cruising speed was about 180 kilometers an hour (Akhtar, 2008).

Pakistan Navy launched its first fast attack craft named PNS Azmat in 2012. It was manufactured jointly by China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSOC) and Pakistan Navy. Its launching ceremony was held at Xingjian Shipyard in Tianjin. Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Muhammad Asif Sandila, was the chief guest there. It was an enduring operational requirement of Pakistan Navy. Pakistan and China signed an agreement for the development of two fast attack crafts on the basis of the transfer of technology (ToT) in 2010. The first craft was to be manufactured in China and the second was at KSEW. These ships were named as AZMAT Class FAC (M).

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