This study critically examines Nigeria’s security policy and counter-radicalization strategies in addressing the Boko Haram insurgency between 2015 and 2025. The insurgency, which has devastated Nigeria’s northeast and spilled across the Lake Chad Basin, prompted a hybrid security response that combines military offensives with deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration initiatives. Drawing upon qualitative research, including key informant interviews with security officials, civil society leaders, religious figures, and community members, as well as secondary analysis of government reports, scholarly literature, and international publications, the study evaluates the extent to which these measures have been effective. The research employs Securitization Theory, Counterinsurgency Theory, and State Fragility perspectives to interrogate how Boko Haram has been framed as an existential threat, how military and political solutions have been balanced, and how governance has shaped counter-radicalization outcomes. Findings reveal that while the Nigerian military successfully disrupted Boko Haram’s centralized command and reclaimed lost territories, the insurgency remains resilient through asymmetric attacks and ideological entrenchment. Programs such as Operation Safe Corridor and the Sulhu Initiative introduced innovative non-military approaches, but they face legitimacy crises due to opacity, inadequate funding, community resentment, and the absence of victim-centered restitution. The study concludes that Nigeria’s strategy achieved tactical gains but fell short of achieving strategic stability. It recommends stronger community engagement, transparent evaluation of reintegration programs, improved inter-agency collaboration, and sustained investment in socio-economic reforms as key to breaking the insurgency’s cyclical resilience.

Keywords: Security Policy, Counter-Radicalization Strategies, Boko Haram Insurgency